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‘The world in which you live from day to day is made from habit and memory. The perilous 
zones are the times when the self, also made from habit and memory, gives way. Then, if 
only for a moment, you may become something other you have been.’ (John Gray, The 
Silence of Animals) 
 
This quote from Gray pretty much sums up the entire polemic of my book on cinema (Film, 
Nihilism and the Restoration of Belief), but perhaps a lot more elegantly and concisely than 
me. I also didn’t discover Gray’s book, The Silence of Animals from which the quote is 
taken, until some time after the book had been published, otherwise I would almost 
certainly have included it. I believe that the world and the constructed selves presented by 
so many ‘popular’ films (classic continuity) are direct analogues of the everyday world and 
the selves made from habit and memory within it. However, I argue that certain types of 
film (what I call ‘counter-sense films’) are capable of creating moments where that world 
and self are overwhelmed, disrupted, disoriented, and overcome, allowing for something 
else - visions of different worlds and other selves - other possibilities for becoming. There 
are films that go beyond the orthodoxies associated with the dominant paradigm of 
popular cinema, and enable us to perceive things otherwise, that profoundly disturb our 
perceptual habits and patterns of thought, and suggest new ways of perceiving the world, 
new emotional affects and new ways of thinking. 
 
However, in my paper today I want to focus on something other than these unorthodox 
‘counter-sense’ films, and talk about something I think is very necessary, and which is the 
subject of the first chapter of my book - namely the power of classical continuity film. This 
analysis brings me into direct confrontation with two of the major cognitive and analytic film 
theorists - the philosopher Noel Carroll and the film theorist David Bordwell. 
 
Arguably, the most prevalent and debilitating cinematic myth is that of realism and 
naturalism - where the cinematic world is taken to be an ontological analogue of a real 
world. How is it that film manages to achieve this? I think that the answer to this question 
lies in a detailed reflection on what makes up film’s materiality (i.e. its essential 
photographic quality), together with filmic form and its peculiar ability to emulate normal 
and established perceptual processes in the minds of the audience. I am not going to 
spend any time today on any discussion of film and photography (which I do in the book), 
but concentrate my attention on film and the development of classical continuity. In classic 
Hollywood films of the 1930’s and 1940’s a set of clearly defined orthodox techniques 
emerged for establishing the filmic realm as an analogue of the existing world. These 
techniques became habituated, naturalised and established - operating invisibly and 
seamlessly within much mainstream film today. 
 
The basic function of the continuity system is to create a smooth flow between different the 
different shots that make up the film. Early forms of cinema tended to emulate the fixed 
perspective of theatre, and consisted of longer static shots where numerous actions would 
unfold. As cinema developed it abandoned the theatrical aesthetic. Through being situated 
in a unified and consistent temporality in recognisable and definable spatial locales the 
assemblage of shots made for most conventional films began to be organised and edited 
primarily through the continuous dynamics of action narrative. This form of editing dynamic 
binds all of the depicted action into a tight chain of cause and effect where different events 
are linked through a transparently readable series of associative chains which occur in 
ordered space and time. The space of each scene is constructed along an axis of action, 
where it is assumed that everything takes place along a discernible, predictable line. This 
ensures the perception of common space from shot to shot. Space is delineated clearly. 
As a viewer I know exactly where characters are in relation to each other and to the 
setting. I always know where a character is with respect to the unfolding narrative action. 
The space of the scene, clearly and unambiguously articulated, does not jar or disorient; 
such disorientation would distract me from the centre of the action (and, therefore, the 
narrative chain of causal associations). So powerful is my desire to follow the action 
flowing across the edits in classical continuity film that I tend to either ignore the cut 
between shots or am simply unaware of its presence. Psychologically the similarity of 
movement and milieu from shot to shot holds my attention as a viewer more than the 
differences resulting from the edits.  
 
One of the enduring characteristics associated with classic Hollywood cinema is its 
insistence upon constructing continuity narrative on the assumption that the primary active 
forces are embodied within the individual characters who act as causal agents. Hollywood 
has refined and accelerated this fundamental narrative strategy to such an extent that it 
has become almost entirely ‘naturalised’ within the minds of contemporary audiences. 
Indeed, much contemporary film theory operates on the dubious assumption that the 
dominant narrative convention of classical Hollywood continuity cinema appears the way it 
does, and is so successful, simply because ‘that is how the mind actually works’. However, 
it is surely just a convention that has such a powerful grip as to have become effectively 
naturalised in the mind of audiences.  
 
Let’s consider a sequence from an iconic Hollywood film that might be considered 
emblematic in this regard. The sequence is the opening sequence from Alfred Hitchock’s 




The sequence self-evidently consists of a night-time rooftop chase in San Francisco. It 
begins with a close-up of an iron rung followed by two hands gripping it. The camera pulls 
back to reveal a figure pulling himself up a ladder onto a rooftop, and he runs out of shot. 
He is closely followed by a uniformed police officer carrying a gun. Within seconds the 
inferential association has been clearly established for the audience – this is a pursuit, in 
fact it is a dangerous pursuit signaled by both the height of the location and the police 
officer’s weapon. The uniformed policeman is closely followed onto the roof by a plain-
clothed figure (played by James Stewart) – the clear logical inference at this point being 
that he is the detective in the scenario. We then cut to a panning shot of the San Francisco 
cityscape (clearly signaled by such iconic locations as the Golden Gate Bridge visible in 
the shot), emphasising and underlining for us the perilous height of this pursuit. Two 
bullets are fired by the policeman during this part of the pursuit. We cut to a shot of the 
pursued figure leaping across a gap between buildings onto an adjacent roof and 
successfully pulling himself up and over. He is then followed by the policeman, who also 
leaps but is shown to slightly stumble and slip before also successfully pulling himself up 
and over. This logical sequence quickly initiates an immediate sense of suspense for we 
the audience realise that the figure of the detective now must also make this leap. In fact, 
as the detective leaps he stumbles, slips and is shown falling off of the roof. He is left 
hanging from a gutter by his fingertips. We immediately cut to a shot of the policeman who 
realises that the detective has fallen, and he looks back and makes the decision (a 
seemingly natural decision for us) to go back and help. We are shown the detective 
hanging desperately from the gutter and staring down at the city several storeys below, 
and at this point Hitchcock introduces his famous ‘vertigo’ zoom shot as we are shown the 
first-person perception shot of the detective’s vertiginous experience of heights which 
freezes him in terror. The policeman leans over and encourages the detective to ‘give me 
your hand’, but the detective is rigid with fear. The subsequent shots accentuate the 
extreme peril as we are shown the detective shot from above as he hangs from the 
rooftop. The policeman leans out further to try and reach him but slips and is shown falling 
to his death. With absolutely minimal dialogue, relying solely upon the logic of the edited 
sequence of images, Hitchcock manages to convey, at the very beginning of the film, all of 
the salient narrative information, as well as a good deal of suspense, terror and anxiety, in 
the most efficient and ‘natural’ way. By the end of this short sequence we know that the 
plain-clothed character played by James Stewart is a San Francisco police detective, that 
he has a incapacitating fear of heights, and that this incapacitation contributed to the death 
of a policeman. These three key pieces of information are absolutely vital for 
understanding the subsequent events of the film, and they are all conveyed through filmic 
sequencing alone. Crucially this sequencing is immediately accessible and cognitively 
transparent to audiences watching the film. 
 
How do the conventions at play in a classic sequence such as this actually work, and how 
do they manage to present themselves as ‘naturalised’ realms of cause and effect?  
Classic Hollywood films function through psychological, behavioral and moral norms. They 
allow for easy identification by an audience, activating cognitive norms, associative 
patterns of thinking and behaving, and recognisable forms of identity and interpersonal 
relations. They solicit a desire for narrative coherence in reality – closure, pattern, 
symmetry, synchronicity and significance. Part of what makes classic continuity film 
appear invisible and, to some extent, natural, is its developed ability to draw upon a range 
of cognitive skills we have acquired for negotiating the everyday world and that are so 
familiar that they appear entirely automatic. Continuity editing is a powerful tool for 
reinforcing our cognitive and perceptual habits, rendering film as an organic naturalistic 
phenomenon. The classical Hollywood film world is marked by a high level of internal 
consistency where events appear to not be constructed for filmic purposes but as a pre-
existing and tangible story-world that is framed and recorded from without. Such classical 
film narration usually involves the concealment of the means of production and creates an 
illusion of the passive, invisible and outsider observer who is watching a spectacle that 
appears not to have been artificially constructed but that pre-exists its formal and narrative 
representation in film. Hence, the ongoing significance of having a recognisable filmic 
milieu. The form that the action of the narrative takes for the spectator can be considered 
as a carefully constructed analogue of their natural psychology. Since the 1930’s the 
practical and technical devices which are employed by Hollywood have become organised 
into a highly stable and robust paradigm, and, like all paradigms, have a tendency to 
become naturalised as the truth, or as reality itself. The stylistic conventions associated 
with this classical paradigm have become immediately and intuitively recognisable to most 
audiences. Within the dominant Hollywood tradition there is a continued obedience to a 
set of highly developed extrinsic norms which govern the formal construction of most films. 
The principal innovations, to the extent to which they exist, occur almost completely at the 
level of content, in terms of the stories which films tell within certain established genres, 
rather than form. 
 
Consider the conventional art of cinematic realism in terms of its sequencing and 
narration. According to cognitive approaches, typical cinematic form engages important 
aspects of our perceptual apparatus and cognitive associations that are already 
established for processing our understanding of the reality in which we function. The same 
cognitive architecture is activated by cinema as by everyday reality, and just as our abiding 
cognitive concern is with a search for coherent sense, the same goes for our relationship 
with film. According to such a view cinematic sequences are constructed through a variety 
of formal means for exploiting our ‘natural’ cognitive and perceptual dispositions. One of 
the most prominent advocates of this view of film is the American film philosopher Noel 
Carroll, who deploys a cognitive schema to comprehend the norms governing film 
perception and cognition. Carroll’s approach identifies three major formal components that 
are utilised by film for successfully influencing and directing the audience’s attention – 
‘indexing’, ‘bracketing’ and ‘scaling’. I want to look at each of these in turn. 
 
Indexing occurs when the camera isolates filmic attention on a specific subject through 
movement, cut or zoom. For example, Alfred Htchcock, a master of the art of ‘indexing’, 
uses it very effectively in a number of sequences from Vertigo, as well Dial M for Murder, 
Rear Window and North by Northwest. In Vertigo, when the retired detective character of 
Scottie, played by James Stewart, is employed by an old college friend to trail his wife 
Madeleine, played by Kim Novak, the friend invites him to observe them at dinner at a 




In this sequence we move slowly from a close-up of Scottie sat at the bar to a wide shot of 
the entire restaurant before focusing upon the table where his friend and Madeleine are 
sitting. As they leave the restaurant Madeleine walks past Scottie and Hitchcock uses an 
indexical technique to isolate Madeleine’s face in profile for Scottie. (There is a beautiful 
rhythm to the editing in this sequence) This technique for isolating this character’s profile is 
used again later in the film when a now grief stricken Scottie spots a girl in the street who 
resembles the dead Madeleine. The technique is notably used again in the film when 
Scottie and Madeleine visit the Spanish Mission to recover the past which seems to be 
haunting Madeleine. Standing outside the Mission’s chapel Madeleine insists on going in 
alone, and as she breaks from Scottie’s embrace she stops and stares up at the chapel’s 
tower before running into the chapel. We cut to an indexical shot of this tower. We then cut 
back to Scottie who sees her glance upwards and looks there himself. We cut back to 
another indexical shot of the tower and then back to a close-up of Scottie’s face as he 
realises, too late, her suicidal intentions. Both of these indexical shots of the tower serve to 
clarify the narrative intentionality of the sequence, allowing the audience to identify with 
the thoughts and actions of the characters onscreen. The final example of indexing is in 
fact the key to Scottie’s unlocking of the elaborate criminal conspiracy within which he has 
become enmeshed, and concerns the instance of Carlotta Valdes’ necklace. Towards the 
end of the film when the grief stricken Scottie has made over the character of Judy to 
resemble the dead figure of Madeleine he recognises the necklace that Judy asks him to 
put on her as having belonged to Madeleine. As he recognises the necklace around Judy’s 
neck Hitchcock provides a series of indexical flashback shots of the necklace appearing in 
the portrait of Carlotta Valdes, around Madeleine’s neck and then around Judy’s neck. It is 
the necklace which allows him to realise the truth that Judy and Madeleine are in fact one 
person, and that he has been hoodwinked all along by an elaborate criminal conspiracy 
perpetrated by his old college friend to murder his wife.  
 
For Carroll this process of perceptual isolation and focus emulates the way our perceptual 
system actually functions in the everyday world, and is a powerful means for simulating the 
way our perceptual system is composed of successive shifts of attention that appear 
automatic and natural. A character’s isolated perception of an object is emulated for us 
through a rapid moment of visual indexing, and more often than not this has the seamless 
appearance of according with the natural flow of our own perceptual expectations and 
habits. Although highly stylised and artificial, demanding a high level of technical 
innovation and post-production, indexing has emerged as a very successful means for 
ensuring the smooth and seemingly natural flow of images in film narartive. 
 
In addition to the techniques developed with regards to ‘indexing’, the cinema is also able 
to direct our attention by ‘bracketing’ what it is that we are seeing on screen at any given 
point in time. By choosing to focus attention on specific objects, characters or events, the 
camera is able to edit out everything that is beyond the natural perimeter of the frame. 
Take, for example, the opening scene of Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, which famously 
depicts a conversation in a booth at a diner between two characters (played by Tim Roth 
and Amanda Plummer). For the purposes of this sequence the booth is bracketed off from 
the rest of the diner (which is, at this point, not narratively significant). Our attention is 
focussed entirely upon the two interlocutors. Later, as the film unfolds and the characters 
initiate a heist, the bracketing is loosened so that our attention becomes diverted away 
from the booth onto the diner as a whole. Bracketing provides an effective and flexible 
means for directing perceptual attention in film, and has become one of the cornerstones 
of classical narrative filmmaking. However, in addition to its role in directing perception, it 
has also become an effective means for implying exteriority and ontological continuity, 
thereby becoming part of the way film attains a sense of realism. The danger of artificially 
bracketing off a specific milieu is that one might easily isolate and hermetically separate a 
particular scene from its continuity with the outside world (e.g. as in a Beckett play, but in 
Beckett hermetic claustrophobia is entirely intentional). This creates a perceptual 
disturbance and disrupts the spectator’s overall expectation of filmic realism. However, 
techniques have emerged to ensure that bracketing continues to imply exteriority and 
continuity. Two examples which demonstrate this, both taken from Alfred Hitchcock, are 
found in the bracketed apartment set of Rope and the rear of the apartment block in Rear 
Window. In both films the bracketing of a specific milieu is absolutely crucial to the success 
of the subsequent action. Yet with both films Hitchcock devised innovative ways to imply 
ontological exteriority and continuity. In Rope this is achieved by the shifts in light across 
the cityscape of the apartment window, together with occasional external sounds. In Rear 
Window there is an alley between apartment buildings which leads to a busy city street 
with a bar on the opposite side. Here Hitchcock allows us a limited and subtle view onto an 
imaginary external world (outside of the main filmic milieu of the apartment buildings 
themselves), which is indicated by passing traffic and pedestrians.  
 
Bracketing has become one of the most powerful orthodox techniques for isolating 
perceptual activity to a specific filmic milieu, set of characters and objects, yet mainitaing a 
sense of organic naturalism and ontological realism. By utilising this technique the 
filmmaker is able to indicate to the audience what is important at specific moments during 
the film. Everything outside the frame has been bracketed from the audience’s attention, 
thereby emulating the seemingly natural perceptual process associated with the everyday. 
But it has also been harnessed to augment the overall sense of film realism by implying 
the ontological continuity of the bracketed filmic elements with the everyday world we all 
inhabit. The ontological continuum constructed by ordinary perception, where our ordinary 
isolated perceptions are always incorporated into a totality, is emulated to some degree by 
this cinematic technique.  
 
In addition to arguing that ‘indexing’ and ‘bracketing’ developed to control attention by 
isolating certain details over others in film, Carroll identifies the way that film manipulates 
the ‘scale’ of what an audience is looking at. Through scaling the director is able to fill the 
screen (and hence the audience’s awareness) with whatever they deem necessary and 
appropriate. Consider, for example, Sergio Leone’s famous technique of extreme facial 
close-ups in films such as Once Upon a Time in the West where the screen is filled with 
close-ups of character’s eyes during tense gunfights. Scaling also enables the filmmaker 
to render what is less narratively significant much smaller and, as a result, a less likely 




One of Carroll’s most important insights is that the coordination of these visual techniques 
render most typical and conventional films, as they unfold from shot to shot, as not only 
easy to follow but as being structured in an entirely natural way and entirely in accordance 
with normal perception. The highly structured, dynamic and stylised film schema has the 
tendency to be a passive perceptual experience insofar as it naturally accords with our 
perceptual habits. This emulation of normal perceptual processes is also extended into 
cognitive associations. It is not merely a question of establishing a naturalistic perceptual 
trajectory but also an inferential and associative chain of cognition. Film emulates the 
tendency of natural cognition to be guided by inductive force. Most typical cinema will 
contain visual aspects where the inferential linkage is unavoidable and inevitable (i.e. 
passive induction), yet most will rely, to some extent, upon the viewer to actively arrive at 
an inferential hypothesis that consummates the sense a filmmaker intends to convey. 
There is a certain degree of autonomous cognitive activity being solicited by conventional 
films, which is often regarded as one of the major pleasures associated with film 
spectatorship. Hitchcock is often regarded as a master of this particular technique, 
emulating and manipulating the thought of the audience to a remarkably high degree. 
Filmmakers, Carroll argues, rely almost entirely upon established inferential associations 
and interpretational processes that we all employ to negotiate everyday reality. Hence, in 
order to successfully cognise a film narrative the operative assumption is that we utilise 
exactly the same kinds of beliefs, associations and inferential strategies that we normally 
employ with regards to everyday reality. This is Carroll’s second crucial insight; it is not 
necessary to internalise a specific semiotic in order to comprehend film narrative Rather, 
most typical film can be approached in terms of ordinary and established patterns of 
reasoning and the employment of familiar and existing beliefs regarding human behaviour, 
motivation and action. This can still, however, be understood as a somewhat active 
process.  
 
Carroll’s view of normal film perception and cognition delimits film ontology to a narrow 
and restricted realm (i.e.as an analogue of the established familiar and habitual everyday), 
even within films that are presenting a fantasmagoric realm. Films which formally deviate 
from what he regards as typical are almost always consigned to being interpreted from 
within the established and orthodox paradigm, thereby enabling him to categorise their 
aberrance and deviation from the norm as being almost entirely driven by a desire ‘to lay 
bare reflexively the structures that make the normal narrative motion picture experience 
what it is.’ Whilst Carroll has no argument against this particular function, he appears 
incapable of assigning to any film which deviates from the norm any other orientation than 
the normative. Those films which deviate from the norm, break the habits of perception, 
are consigned to that class of films which either form a reactionary impulse against the 
orthodox, or are concerned merely with reflexively exposing the mechanics which underpin 
that orthodoxy. This class of film, for Carroll, is almost entirely meta-cinematic according to 
- i.e. being merely films about films.  
 
Films as puzzling and paradoxical as, for example, Alain Resnais’ Last Year in Marienbad, 
Hiroshima Mon Amour or Je T’Aime Je T’Aime, or Michelangelo Antonioni’s L’Avventura, 
or  David Lynch’s INLAND EMPIRE, are reduced to just being films that function through 
the way they frustrates our ordinary narrative expectations, in the way that they refuses to 
offer us not only the natural inferential associations at both perceptual and cognitive level, 
but also in terms of their narrative structure (or lack of one). Resnais' film Last Year in 
Marienbad, set in a chateau at Marienbad, tells the story of a man who approaches a 
woman claiming to have met and had a relationship with her the previous year, yet she 
claims never to have met him before. It proceeds through a series of ambiguous 
flashbacks and extremely disorientating temporal and spatial shifts. In this highly original 
way the film provides a fascinating exploration of the relationships between the different 
characters, constantly questioning the status of reality, memory and fantasy. 
Conversations and events are repeated in several places in the chateau and grounds, and 
there are numerous tracking shots of the chateau's corridors, with ambiguous voiceovers. 
However, for Carroll this film is merely consigned to being a reactionary film, anchored in a 
revolt against convention. All of these things may in fact be true but for Carroll they are not 
simply true but express pretty much everything there is to know and say about this 
enigmatic film. The film exists to bring us to a state of awareness regarding the way in 
which our established (and usually implicit) expectations assist us in following and 
organising films as they unfold, simply through the fact that these expectations are 
consistently frustrated and perverted. Such films as this do not elaborate either a separate 
and autonomous semiotic or alternative filmic reality since all they do, according to Carroll, 
is playfully subvert our given perceptual and cognitive apparatus. The effect of this is to 
provide an acute sense of awareness with regard to these faculties which are all too often 
hidden, implicit and automatic.  
 
By drawing upon Carroll’s cognitivist paradigm, the American film theorist David Bordwell 
has also produced some interesting work on orthodox film cognition and comprehension. 
Bordwell argues that comprehending a film is always a constructive activity on the part of 
the spectator, ‘spectators participate in a complex process of actively elaborating what the 
film sets forth’. He acknowledges Carroll’s point that such a process draws upon ordinary 
and everyday reasoning where one draws upon prior knowledge, makes informal and 
provisional inferences and, based upon the presence of inductive force, hypothesises as 
to what is likely to happen next. It is a matter of coming to understand the way in which 
films are deliberately designed to elicit the sorts of cognition that result in comprehension. 
In his recent work, Bordwell has focussed on seeing films as ‘norm-driven’ systems for 
providing spectators with clear cognitive cues. Such cues initiate a process of cognitive 
activity and elaboration, resulting in an ongoing process of inferential associations and 
hypotheses. The spectator always brings to the various cues that are presented within a 
film certain established knowledge which enables them to extrapolate and speculate 
beyond the specific information given in the cue. Similarly, there is an assumption that the 
spectator possesses some basic understanding of narrative structure which allows for 
some information to be taken for granted and other information to be understood as crucial 
exposition or as an important revelation. For Bordwell the film gains its effects ‘only in 
relation to a body of norms, sets of schemata, and the processes which the spectator 
initiates.’ His active and constructive model of film comprehension, which relies upon the 
presence of certain knowledge, norms and schemata, does at least allow for the possibility 
that a spectator could go beyond the basic information supported by a film in order to 
arrive at their own interpretation. As Bordwell claims, ‘what makes a film understandable is 
not necessarily exhausted by what the filmmakers deliberately put in to be understood.’ 
Bordwell insists that the cognitive operation undertaken by the audiences of classic 
Hollywood cinema are not entirely passive despite drawing largely upon the habitual and 
the familiar. However, he acknowledges that such audiences have their cognitive 
processes activated, manipulated and controlled in a very strict and absolute way.  
 
Classical narration demands that the spectator actively constructs the stylistic features 
being presented in a single way – what both Carroll and Bordwell regard as the ‘natural’ 
way. For example, one could not reasonably claim to reach the end of Capra’s It’s a 
Wonderful Life and still have reached the conclusion that George Bailey (James Stewart) 
would still be better off dead. With Capra’s film there is a single truth to be arrived at. The 
spectator actively constructs form and meaning to a certain established and orthodox 
process of knowledge, memory and inference. Successful narrative films function by 
providing the spectator with a series of inputs that are needed to undertake the coherent 
associative chain of inferences and establish story. As we have already indicated, this is 
augmented through the formal techniques developed within cinema for managing 
perception (i.e. managing the flow of perceptual attention). This allows both Carroll and 
Bordwell to conclude that most typical films are accessible simply because they so 
effectively employ our natural perceptual and cognitive capacities. Thus the ontology of 
film is entirely analogous with the reality established by everyday perception and cognition 
operating in the everyday - the reality of film is an analogy of everyday reality. 
 
Alongside Carroll’s claims regarding the derivative nature of aberrant forms of cinema 
(discontinuous, counter-sense and non-linear forms of cinema such as Resnais’ Last Year 
in Marienbad), Bordwell claims that alternative forms of cinema always mobilise, echo or 
trace classical narrative form in order to solicit different forms of perception and cognition. 
For both of these thinkers, in an unsustainable reductionist move, alternative cinematic 
forms are always subordinated to the pre-existing norms associated with the classical 
paradigm. The way in which both theorists anchor film perception and cognition so closely 
to the orthodox paradox means that something essential regarding cinema risks being lost. 
They refuse to consider film outside of the conventional paradigm and to consider the 
possibility that film has the capacity to construct an entirely separate and alternative 
semiotic, sense, ontology and epistemology. In my book I argue that film must be 
reconceived in opposition to this view, and claim that film has a range of intrinsic (albeit all-
too-often underemployed) capacities for vertiginous affectivity, alternative realities and 
mystery which go beyond orthodox and habitual modes of perception and comprehension.  
 
Film should not be restricted to the reproduction and formal expression of normal 
perception and cognition. Such a view operates first and foremost on an impoverished 
assumption regarding the nature of what cognition is in its totality, rather than seeing film 
as reproducing one mode of cognition amongst many.  It also neglects the fact that film 
itself plays a role in the construction of this particular mode of thought. It rests on the view 
that the majority of narrative film is so successful simply because it adheres to the ‘natural’ 
order of human cognition. This view of cognition is underpinned by both naturalism and 
essentialism. By only ever appealing to the most generic, habitual and familiar ways of 
thinking, behaving, and being affected, too many films result in the mere activation of the 
small ‘I’, the self that one already is.  The activation of the larger ‘I’, the self that one might 
yet become beyond habit and established memory, requires an unfamiliar counter-sense, 
a trauma associated with formal and structural innovation, challenges to narrative norms 
and associations which are uncomfortable, troubling, disturbing, and involve concentration, 
learning to see things in new ways, a willingness to open oneself up to the new and to the 
different, and to discover new levels of the self, new forms of emotional, cognitive, visceral 
affectivity, new understandings of the self and its relation to others and the world. 
 
All too often the cinema of counter-sense, as opposed to that of common sense, is just 
seen as the province of art cinema rather than an important element of popular mass 
culture. This distinction has become normalised, and it seems that it just is the case that 
difficult and challenging ideas, expressed in unfamiliar and challenging ways, will not have 
a mass audience. The assumption appears to be that mass audiences merely want the 
reproduction of familiar forms, activating and reinforcing the familiar small ‘I’. This is the 
problem with realism and naturalism in cinema - it is a pernicious and dangerous cultural 
assumption which ignores the extent to which any new and innovative form (particularly in 
the cinema), that is perceived as anti-realist, non-naturalistic, counter-sense, unorthodox, 
and non-linear, contains its own pedagogy of seeing, interpreting and understanding. The 
naturalised (and patronising) assumption that mass audiences lack the capacity to engage 
with a new object’s (i.e. a film’s) implicit formal pedagogy is extremely restrictive and elitist. 
It suggests a sinister assumption regarding our capacity to activate and cultivate a larger 
self, by closing down any possible notion of a self other than what one already is, and has 
become through habit and memory. In conclusion, to reiterate Gray’s point, and to return 
to the main polemic in my own book, something has to give if we are, both culturally and 
individually, to become something other than we have always been. 
